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Abstract 
Two axioms are shown to characterize the relative majority rule when preferences are defined over two alternatives. 
According to one axiom, if all the individuals in a group are indifferent, then the associated group preference is 
indifference. The second axiom states that a group S prefers alternative a to alternative b if and only if there is a 
subgroup T whose members unanimously prefer a to b and such that, if S ≠ T, indifference represents the preference 
of the group S/T.
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1. Introduction 
 
This note offers an axiomatization of the (relative) majority rule for the case in which 
preferences are defined over two alternatives. May (1952, p. 682), Fishburn (1973, p. 
58; 1983, p. 33) and Llamazares (2006, p. 319) have suggested axiomatizations when 
the set of individuals is fixed and their preferences are variable. Aşan and Sanver (2002, 
p. 411), Woeginger (2003, p. 91; 2005, p. 9) and Miroiu (2004, p. 362) characterize the 
majority rule when both the set of individuals and their preferences are variable. Xu and 
Zhong’s (2010, p. 120) axiomatization assumes the set of individuals to be variable but 
their preferences to be fixed. 
 
The framework adopted in this note allows individuals and preferences to vary. The 
universal set of individuals may be finite, as in Miroiu (2004), or infinite, as in Aşan 
and Sanver (2002) and Woeginger (2003, 2005). The characterization just postulates 
two axioms. One, that groups constituted by indifferent individuals are indifferent. And 
two, that having a group with strict preference a is equivalent to having a decomposition 
of the group into two subgroups, one being indifferent or empty and the other consisting 
of individuals with preference a.  
 
 
2. Definitions and axioms 
 
Let  I be a non-empty (finite or infinite) subset of the set of positive integers. The 
members of I designate individuals. A society (or group) is a finite non-empty subset of 
I. The set of alternatives is {α, β}, with α ≠ β. A preference over {α, β} is represented 
by a number from the set {−1, 0, 1}. If the number is 1, α is preferred to β; if −1, β is 
preferred to α; if 0, α is indifferent to β. A preference profile for a society S is a 
function pS : S → {−1, 0, 1} assigning a preference over {α, β} to each member of S. 
The set P is the set of all preference profiles for all societies in I. For positive integer r, 
Pr is the set of all preference profiles for societies with exactly r members. 
 
For preference profile pS and society T ⊂ S, pT is the restriction of pS to T, that is, the 
preference profile pT for T such that, for all i ∈ T, pT(i) = pS(i). For pS ∈ P and i ∈ S, pi 
abbreviates pS(i). If pS1, … , pSr are preference profiles for mutually disjoint societies S1, 
… , Sr, then (pS1, … , pSr) is the preference profile for the aggregate society S1 ∪ … ∪ 
Sr. Preference profile pS is unanimous if there is a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that, for all i ∈ S, pi 
= a. The preference profile for S such that, for all i ∈ S, pi = a, is denoted by (a
S). The 




Definition 2.1. A social welfare function is a mapping f : P → {−1, 0, 1}. 
 
A social welfare function transforms the preferences over {α, β} of all the members of 
any given society S into a collective preference over {α,  β} (or, alternatively, a 
decision). Specifically, f(pS) = 1 means that society S prefers α to β (or that α is the 
chosen alternative); f(pS) = −1, that S prefers β to α (β is the chosen alternative); and 
f(pS) = 0, that S is indifferent between α and β (a tie arises because no alternative is 
chosen). 
 
Definition 2.2. The majority rule is the social welfare function μ : P → {−1, 0, 1} such 
that, for all pS ∈ P: (i) if ∑i∈S pi > 0, then μ(pS) = 1; (ii) if ∑i∈S pi < 0, then μ(pS) = −1; 
and (iii) if ∑i∈S pi = 0, then μ(pS) = 0. 
 
A0. For every society S ⊆ I, f(0
S) = 0. 
 
A1. For all pS ∈ P and a ∈ {−1, 1}, f(pS) = a if and only if there is T ⊆ S such that pT = 
(a
T) and, if S ≠ T, f(pS\T) = 0. 
 
A0 is the unanimity principle for the particular case in which all the individuals are 
indifferent. A1 holds that f(pS) = a if and only if pS can be partitioned into a unanimous 
profile (a
T) and the preference profile pS\T of an indifferent society (with S = T allowed). 
More specifically, A1 requires that if f(pS) = a ≠ 0, then the preference aggregation 
problem represented by pS can be reduced to a unanimous preference aggregation 
problem by removing the preferences of some indifferent society. Conversely, A1 also 





Proposition 3.1. A social welfare function f satisfies A0 and A1 if and only if f is the 
majority rule. 
 
Proof. “⇐” The majority rule obviously satisfies A0. With respect A1, choose pS ∈ P 
and suppose that, for some a ∈ {−1, 1}, there is T ⊆ S such that pT = (a
T) and, if S ≠ T, 
μ(pS\T) = 0. It must be shown that μ(pS) = a. If S = T, then pS = (a
S) and, evidently, μ(pS) 
= μ(a
S) = a. If S ≠ T, then μ(pS\T) = 0 implies μ(pS) = μ(pT). Since pT = (a
T), μ(pT) = a. 
Conversely, suppose that, for some a ∈ {−1, 1}, μ(pS) = a. It must be shown that there −3− 
is T ⊆ S such that pT = (a
T) and, if S ≠ T, μ(pS\T) = 0. If pS = (a
S), then the desired T is S 
itself. If pS ≠ (a
S), then define M = {i ∈ S: pi = −a} and A = {i ∈ S: pi = a}. Case 1: M = 
∅. In this case, pS = (a
A, 0
S\A). As μ(0
S\A) = 0, the desired T is A. Case 2: M ≠ ∅. Given 








S\(A∪M)) = 0, the desired T is A\N. 
 
“⇒” Part 1: for all a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and society S ⊆ I, f(a
S) = a. Let a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. 
Consider any society S ⊆ I. If a = 0, then, by A0, f(a
S) = a. If a ≠ 0, then, letting pS = a
S, 
there is T ⊆ S such that pT = (a
T): S itself. By A1, f(a
S) = a. 
 
Part 2: for all a ∈ {−1, 1}, i ∈ I and j ∈ I\{i}, f(a
i, −a
j) = 0. Suppose not: f(a
i, −a
j) = b ≠ 
0. Letting p{i,j} = (a
i, −a
j), by A1, there is a non-empty T ⊆ {i, j} such that pT = (b
T) and, 
if {i, j} ≠ T, f(p{i,j}\T) = 0. Clearly, T cannot be {i, j}. If T = {i}, then {i, j}\T = {j} and 0 
= f(p{i,j}\T) = f(pj) = f(−a
j), which contradicts part 1. If T = {j}, then {i, j}\T = {i} and 0 = 
f(p{i,j}\T) = f(pi) = f(a
i), which contradicts part 1. 
 
Part 3: f = μ on P1 ∪ P2. By parts 1 and 2, it suffices to show that, for all a ∈ {−1, 1}, 
f(a
i, 0
j) = a, where i ∈ I and j ∈ I\{i}. By A0, f(0
j) = 0. Hence, by A1, f(a
i, 0
j) = a. 
 
Part 4: f = μ. Taking part 3 as the base case of an induction argument, choose r ≥ 3 and 
assume that f = μ on P1 ∪ … ∪ Pr−1. To show that f = μ on Pr, choose pS ∈ Pr. Case 1: 
μ(pS) = 0. Case 1a: for all i ∈ S, pi = 0. By A0, f(pS) = 0 = μ(pS). Case 1b: for some i ∈ 
S, pi ≠ 0. As a result, there must be i ∈ S and j ∈ S such that pi = 1 and pj = −1. To prove 
that f(pS) = 0, suppose otherwise: f(pS) = a ≠ 0. By A1, there is T ⊆ S such that pT = (a
T) 
and f(pS\T) = 0. That S ≠ T follows from the fact that, for some i ∈ S and j ∈ S, pi = 1 and 
pj = −1. Since μ(pS) = 0 and pT = (a
T), μ(pS\T) = −a. By the induction hypothesis, f(pS\T) = 
μ(pS\T) = −a: contradiction. 
 




Z). Case 2a: M = ∅. If Z = ∅, by part 1, f(pS) = f(a
S) = a = μ(pS). If Z ≠ 
∅, then pS = (a
S\Z, 0
Z). By A0, f(0
Z) = 0. Given this, by A1, f(pS) = a = μ(pS). Case 2b: M 
≠ ∅. Since μ(pS) = a, there is a partition {T, R} of {i ∈ S: pi = a} such that R has the 
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